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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant Citizen Advocates for Regulation and the 
Environment, Inc. (“CARE”) filed a Complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Union under the 
citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k), § 6972(a)(2) (2006).  
CARE also alleges that the district court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) over their claim 
under § 553(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 
U.S.C. § 551-559 (2006). 
 This appeal is from a Final Judgment entered by the 
district court on September 29, 2010, dismissing all of CARE‟s 
claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  (Order at 9).  
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
(2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether RCRA § 7002(a)(2) provides jurisdiction for 
district courts to order the EPA to take action on CARE‟s petition 
filed pursuant to RCRA § 7004. 
 
II.Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides jurisdiction for district 
courts to order the EPA to take action on CARE‟s petition filed 
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). 
 
III. Whether the EPA‟s failure to act on CARE‟s petition 
constituted a constructive denial of that petition and a 
constructive grant of authorization of New Union‟s existing 
program, subject to judicial review under RCRA § 7006(b)(2). 
 
IV.Whether this Court should lift the stay in C.A. No. 18-
2010 and proceed with judicial review of EPA‟s constructive 
actions. 
 
V.Whether the EPA must withdraw its approval of New 
Union‟s program because its resources and performance fail to 
meet RCRA‟s state-authorization criteria. 
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VI.Whether the EPA must withdraw its approval of New 
Union‟s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act is inconsistent under RCRA. 
 
VII. Whether the EPA must withdraw its approval of New 
Union‟s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act renders the program not equivalent 
to the federal program, inconsistent with the federal program, or 
in violation of the Commerce Clause. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 This is an appeal from a final Order of the District Court 
for the District of New Union denying CARE‟s motion for 
summary judgment.  (Order at 9).  CARE petitioned the 
Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) under § 7004 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6974 (2006), 
and § 553(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006), to commence 
withdrawal proceedings of New Union‟s hazardous waste 
regulatory program operating in lieu of the federal program 
under RCRA § 3006(b).  (Order at 4).  CARE supported the 
petition by reporting facts occurring after EPA‟s grant of approval 
that changed New Union‟s program and asserted that New 
Union‟s program now stood contrary to EPA‟s approval criteria.  
Id.  The EPA took no action on CARE‟s petition.  Id. 
CARE instituted an action seeking an injunction under § 
7002(a)(2) of RCRA requiring EPA to act on CARE‟s petition.  Id.  
New Union filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 to intervene on 
this action, which the district court granted.  Id.  The parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment, agreeing that the facts 
were uncontested.  Id.  The district court ultimately denied CARE 
relief by granting New Union‟s motion for summary judgment, 
finding a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the 
characterization of EPA‟s approval or disproval as an order rather 
than a rule.  (Order at 7-9). 
 Simultaneous to the filing of CARE‟s district court action, 
CARE filed a petition for judicial review under RCRA § 7006(b)(2) 
in this Court.  (Order at 4-5).  Specifically, CARE sought review of 
3
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the EPA‟s constructive grant of approval of New Union‟s existing 
hazardous waste regulatory program.  (Order at 5).  New Union 
filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 to intervene in this action 
as well, which this Court granted.  Id.  EPA moved to stay this 
proceeding pending the outcome of the action in district court.  Id.  
The Court granted this unopposed motion and stayed the action.  
Id.  CARE presently seeks to lift the stay and proceed with 
judicial review.  (Order at 1). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
 RCRA provides a comprehensive federal program for 
hazardous waste disposal that permits states to administer their 
own program as long as the state meets RCRA authorization 
standards.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2006).  In 1986, New Union 
sought and was granted authorization under RCRA § 3006 to 
administer its own program through its Department of 
Environmental Protection (“DEP”), as the state met all statutory 
and regulatory requirements issued by Congress and the EPA, 
respectively.  (Order at 5).  In order to meet these requirements, 
New Union assured the EPA that the state had adequate 
resources to administer and enforce the program by issuing 
timely permits, inspecting RCRA-regulated facilities biannually, 
and sufficiently punishing all significant violations.  (Order at 
10).  Among these assurances, New Union noted it had at least 
fifty full-time employees to monitor 1,200      RCRA-permitted 
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities 
(“TSDs”).  Id. 
 In the last decade amidst a financial crisis, New Union has 
depleted its RCRA program resources while continuously issuing 
permits to more than 300 additional TSDs, even though 
approximately 900 of the state‟s facilities currently operate with 
expired permits.  (Order at 10-11).  Although increasing 
permitted facilities, the state has reduced program personnel to 
thirty full-time employees from the fifty employed when the 
program was approved.  (Order at 10).  Further, the state‟s 
assurances that it would inspect all facilities at least every other 
year has resulted in the state inspecting only 10% of the facilities 
annually with the EPA inspecting an additional 10%.  (Order at 
11).  Finally, New Union prosecuted only six of the twenty-two 
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significant permit violations in 2009, and the EPA did the same.  
Id. 
 In 2000, New Union passed the 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act (“ERAA”), which significantly 
amended two pieces of legislation with important environmental 
consequences.  Id.  First, the ERAA amended the Railroad 
Regulation Act (“RRA”) by removing all environmental 
responsibilities concerning intrastate railroad facilities from the 
state‟s RCRA program and vesting that authority in the 
independently run New Union Railroad Commission    
(“Commission”).  (Order at 12).  The amendment removed all 
permitting, inspection, and enforcement authority previously held 
by the DEP and eliminated all criminal sanctions for violations of 
environmental statutes.  Id.  Second, the ERAA amended the 
state‟s RCRA program by effectively prohibiting the treatment, 
storage, or transportation of Pollutant X within the state.  Id.  
The amendment proscribes any current TSD from treating 
Pollutant X, prohibits the DEP from issuing permits for new 
facilities that would treat Pollutant X, and restricts the 
transportation of Pollutant X through the state.  Id.  Instead, all 
Pollutant X is to be sent out of state.  Id. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 Appellate courts use the de novo standard when reviewing 
a district court‟s denial of summary judgment.  PCI Transp. Inc. 
v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 2005).  
Summary judgment is only appropriate if “there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).  Therefore, 
this Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide whether CARE was 
entitled to jurisdiction under RCRA and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 
whether the EPA should be ordered to withdraw its approval of 
New Union‟s hazardous waste regulatory program. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in holding that RCRA § 7002(a)(2) 
does not provide district courts with jurisdiction to order EPA to 
act on CARE‟s properly filed petition under RCRA        § 7004.  
5
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CARE correctly submitted their petition under RCRA § 7004 
since EPA‟s grant of approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste 
program was a rule and not an order.  In addition to the grant of 
approval meeting the conditions of a rule under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) 
(2006), EPA is entitled to Chevron deference on its interpretation 
of RCRA § 7004 that such a grant of approval constitutes a rule.  
Since the Administrator failed to perform a mandatory duty 
required by RCRA § 7004, RCRA § 7002(a)(2) grants jurisdiction 
to district courts to hear this citizen suit filed against EPA. 
Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the 
district court erred by holding to the contrary.  CARE properly 
filed their petition under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) seeking withdrawal of 
EPA‟s authorization of New Union‟s hazardous waste program.  
EPA‟s grant of authorization to New Union‟s program is a rule 
under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), and as such, CARE must be given the 
right to petition for the repeal of that rule under 5 U.S.C. § 
553(e).  The APA is a federal law, CARE is seeking repeal of an 
agency rule under that law, and therefore 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
provides jurisdiction in the district courts. 
 Judicial review is also available in this Court under 42 
U.S.C. § 6976(b)(2) (2006) for the Administrator‟s grant of 
authorization of New Union‟s existing program.  The EPA‟s 
failure to act within a reasonable time on CARE‟s petition was 
tantamount to a denial of the petition.  This denial had the effect 
of a grant of authorization of New Union‟s existing hazardous 
waste program.  The plain language of RCRA § 7006(b)(2) 
specifically grants jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals to review 
this authorization.  This congressional intent, along with 
traditional notions of judicial economy, favors lifting the stay of 
the proceedings currently before this Court and proceeding with 
judicial review of EPA‟s improper grant of authorization of New 
Union‟s program as it existed at the time of the petition. 
Examining New Union‟s program, it is clear that the EPA 
must withdraw its approval.  The program — particularly the 
permitting, inspection, and enforcement aspects — falls well 
below established RCRA minimum standards.  Congress used 
mandatory language to explicitly state that when a program falls 
below these minimum standards the EPA must withdraw its 
authorization.  Further, New Union‟s attempts to amend its 
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environmental statutes are inconsistent under the Hazardous 
Material Transportation Act and are preempted by that statute.  
Removing rail hazardous waste facilities and restricting the 
transportation of Pollutant X violates a list of federal regulations 
promulgated by the EPA.  Finally, New Union‟s proscription of 
most Pollutant X transportation and all Pollutant X treatment, 
storage, and disposal prohibits the free flow of interstate 
commerce and therefore violates the Commerce Clause. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RCRA § 7002(A)(2) PROVIDED JURISDICTION 
WITHIN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF NEW UNION TO ORDER THE 
ADMINISTRATOR TO TAKE ACTION PURSUANT 
TO CARE’S PROPERLY FILED PETITION UNDER 
RCRA § 7004. 
 CARE properly filed a petition under RCRA § 7004, which 
clearly states that “any person may petition the Administrator for 
the . . . repeal of any regulation under this chapter.”  42 U.S.C. § 
6974(a) (2006).  CARE correctly petitioned the Administrator to 
repeal the rule permitting New Union to operate the state 
hazardous waste program in violation of the state‟s permit.  
Under RCRA § 7004(a), the Administrator has a mandatory duty 
to act on the petition.  Id.  Since the Administrator failed to 
perform a nondiscretionary duty, RCRA § 7002(a)(2) clearly 
allowed CARE to bring its citizen suit “in the district court for the 
district in which       the . . . violation occurred.”  42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(2) (2006).  Since the violation occurred in New Union, 
jurisdiction was proper in the District Court of New Union. 
A. CARE’s petition was correctly submitted under 
RCRA § 7004 since the EPA’s approval of New 
Union’s hazardous waste program was a rule and 
not an order. 
 RCRA § 7004(a) clearly states that “[a]ny person may 
petition the Administrator for the   . . . repeal of any regulation 
under this chapter.”  42 U.S.C. § 6974(a).  CARE petitioned the 
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EPA to repeal the rule/regulation permitting New Union to 
operate the state hazardous waste program outside of its permit.  
When statutory language is unambiguous, it should be 
interpreted by its ordinary and common meaning.  Holster v. 
Gatco, Inc., 130 S.Ct. 1575, 1577 (2010).  The ordinary meaning of 
regulation is “a rule or order, having legal force, usually issued by 
an administrative agency.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1398 (9th ed. 
2009) (emphasis added). 
 Since RCRA provides no definition for what constitutes a 
rule or an order, the EPA must look to the APA, the controlling 
act for all agencies, for the definition of a rule.  Under the APA, a 
rule is “the whole or part of an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret or prescribe law or policy . . . .”  5 U.S.C. § 551(4).  In 
Iacaboni v. United States, the district court held that the 
definition of a rule does not require the agency‟s statement to be 
“formally designated as a rule or regulation to fall within the 
APA framework.”  251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1039 (D. Mass. 2003).  
Therefore, the EPA does not have to formally assert that its 
statement is a rule for the statement to be covered by the APA 
rule framework. 
1. The EPA’s inaction on New Union’s program 
constitutes an agency statement. 
 The EPA stated its approval for the program through 
silence.  The Administrator has a mandatory duty to respond in 
writing to CARE‟s petition, among other actions, but the 
Administrator did not.  40 C.F.R. § 271.23(b)(1) (2010).  The 
Administrator‟s inaction for almost one year is a statement from 
the EPA that is “tantamount to approval of [New Union‟s] 
decision[].”  Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 998 (7th Cir. 
1984).  Here, New Union violated its EPA approved state 
hazardous waste program.  The EPA‟s silence and inaction was 
the agency‟s statement approving New Union‟s program. 
 In Balsam v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative 
Services, the court determined that a moratorium on receiving 
certificate-of-need applications was not a rule.  452 So. 2d 976 (Fl. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).  In its analysis, the court explained that an 
agency statement is a rule if it creates particular rights and 
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adversely affects others.  Id. at 977-78.  The EPA‟s statement 
accepting New Union‟s permit violations created a right for New 
Union and other similarly situated states to ignore and actively 
violate their permits.  Additionally, the EPA‟s statement 
adversely affected others since it allowed for the increase in the 
number of hazardous TSDs while decreasing the number of 
employees dedicated to the program.  (Order at 10).  New Union‟s 
program not only violates EPA‟s grant of authorization for the 
program, but it also stands repugnant to the objectives of RCRA.  
In particular, EPA‟s statement allows for “hazardous waste 
management practices . . . which [do not] protect[] human health 
and the environment.  42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4) (2006).  Clearly, the 
EPA‟s statement adversely affects others and is therefore a rule. 
2. Even if this Court rejects the Balsam court’s 
definition of a rule, the EPA’s statement is still 
a rule under the definition provided by § 551(4) 
of the APA. 
 In order for the EPA‟s statement to be a rule, the statement 
must be of “general or particular applicability and future effect 
designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy . . . .”  
5 U.S.C. § 551(4).  The EPA‟s statement applies generally to all 
approved state programs because the statement asserts that EPA 
inaction on a petition is tantamount to a grant of authorization 
for programs that fall below approval requirements.  However, 
the APA‟s definition of rule also allows for particular 
applicability.  5 U.S.C. § 551(4).  It is well established that where 
there is a specific rule, such a rule governs over the general.  
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524 (1989).  
Regardless of whether the EPA‟s statement applies generally to 
all states or specifically to New Union, it still meets the 
requirements for a rule. 
 The EPA‟s statement also has future effect on the law or 
policy of state permit programs.  By allowing New Union to 
continue violating its EPA-approved state program, the EPA is 
stating a new rule that it will allow such violations to persist in 
the future.  Conduct that the agency intends to follow in the 
future clearly has a future effect on the law or policy of state 
permit programs.  Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 669 F. Supp. 536, 
9
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539 (D. Ct. D.C. 1987).  In addition to the future effect on law or 
policy, the EPA‟s statement approves future practices of not only 
New Union‟s program, but also of any state program that has 
undergone changes inconsistent with the approval requirements. 
 The district court erred in holding that the EPA‟s approval 
of New Union‟s program was an order.  Orders are retroactive in 
applicability.  PBW Stock Exch. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 732 (3d Cir. 
1973).  Since the New Union legislature recently passed new laws 
concerning the program, the implications of EPA‟s grant of 
authorization affect facts and situations yet to occur.  The EPA‟s 
approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste program is a rule 
under the definition provided by the APA in § 551(4). 
B. The EPA’s determination that its approval of New 
Union’s hazardous waste program was a rule is 
entitled to Chevron deference. 
 Having established that EPA‟s inaction, or constructive 
action, is a rule under the APA, “the choice [to] proceed[] by 
general rule . . . is one that lies primarily in the informed 
discretion of the administrative agency.”  British Caledonian 
Airways, Ltd. v. C.A.B., 584 F.2d 982, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing 
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)).  Since this 
choice is one within the agency‟s discretion, the EPA‟s 
determination that its approval of New Union‟s program is a rule 
is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Counsel, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 Contrary to the district court‟s holding, the EPA is not 
interpreting the definition of a rule under the APA by stating 
that its approval of New Union‟s program is a rule.  (Order at 6).  
The EPA is interpreting RCRA § 7004(a), a statute clearly 
administered by the EPA.  The EPA is interpreting § 7004(a) to 
declare that the EPA‟s approval of New Union‟s program 
constitutes a rule, and this rule can be promulgated, amended, or 
repealed by the Administrator.  This interpretation by EPA is 
clearly allowed Chevron deference. 
 Chevron employs a two-step process to determine whether 
an agency‟s interpretation of a statute is valid.  The first step is to 
determine whether the statutory language is ambiguous.  Nat’l 
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Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 986 (2005).  If the language is unambiguous, then the Court 
simply applies the plain meaning of the statute regardless of the 
agency‟s interpretation.  Id.  However, if the statutory language is 
ambiguous, as is the term rule in § 7004(a), the Court must 
determine if the agency‟s interpretation is reasonable.  Id.  If the 
agency‟s interpretation is reasonable, the Court must accept that 
interpretation despite the court‟s interpretation differing from the 
agency‟s interpretation.  Id. 
 Since it has been established that the rule referenced in § 
7004(a) is ambiguous, this Court should move to step two and 
hold that EPA‟s interpretation was reasonable.  The record is 
devoid of any evidence showing why EPA‟s approval of New 
Union‟s program was considered a rule by the agency.  However, 
as long at the agency can adequately explain why it interpreted 
its approval to be a rule, the Court must apply Chevron deference.  
Nat’l Cable, 545 U.S. 967 at 981.  This high level of deference is 
appropriate because the purpose of Chevron is to leave the 
interpretation of statutory ambiguities to the expertise of the 
implementing agency.  Id. 
 The district court erred in holding that the EPA interpreted 
the APA‟s definition of rule under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).  The EPA 
rightly interpreted a statute under its authority - RCRA         § 
7004(a).  Since the EPA interpreted RCRA, the agency is entitled 
to great deference under Chevron, and the Court should uphold 
the EPA‟s decision that its approval of New Union‟s program was 
a rule. 
C. RCRA § 7002(a)(2) grants jurisdiction for district 
courts to hear citizen suits filed against the EPA 
because the Administrator failed to perform the 
mandatory duty required by RCRA § 7004. 
 The Administrator failed to perform her mandatory duty to 
act on CARE‟s petition as required by RCRA § 7004, which states 
the Administrator, “within a reasonable time . . . shall take 
action.”  42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (emphasis added).  The well-
established statutory interpretation cannon of noscitur a sociis 
states that a word “gathers meaning from the words around it.”  
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 
11
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U.S. 687, 702 (1995).  Within the same section of RCRA the word 
may is used; if Congress wanted to use the word may, a 
discretionary term, it would have done so.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
6974(a) (“Any person may petition the Administrator . . .”) 
(emphasis added); Neuwirth v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 845 
F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that using “may” in place of 
“shall” affords discretion on the agency enforcing the statute). 
 When “may” and “shall” are used within the same statutory 
section, the ordinary meaning of the words is applied so that the 
former is permissive and the latter mandatory.  Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 
2006) (quoting Haynes v. United States, 891 F.2d 235, 239-40 (9th 
Cir. 1989).  Congress specifically chose to use shall to describe the 
Administrator‟s duty to act on the petition.  While the district 
court asserted that shall does not necessarily require mandatory 
action, this assertion is easily refuted.  (Order at 6).  The 
Supreme Court has stated that Congress‟s use of the mandatory 
word “shall” imposes a nondiscretionary obligation.  Nat’l Ass’n of 
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661 (2007) 
(citing Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001)). 
1. The Administrator failed to perform her 
mandatory duty to act on CARE’s petition. 
 The Administrator had a mandatory duty to act on the 
petition filed by CARE.  The language used throughout § 7002 
and § 7004 includes both may and shall.  It is therefore 
understood that the Legislature could have made the 
Administrator‟s action on a petition discretionary by simply using 
the word may in place of shall.  However, the legislature 
specifically chose shall to indicate the mandatory duty required 
by the Administrator to act on the petition. 
 Although the EPA may assert that they are within the 
reasonable time requirement to respond to the petition in RCRA § 
7004(a), the year between the date the petition was submitted 
and the date that CARE filed an action in the district court is 
unreasonable due to the horrific and blatant violations of New 
Union‟s program.  A one-year abstention from statutorily 
mandated action is an acceptance of New Union‟s program as it 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/5
05 Appellant 4/24/2011  2:30 AM 
138  PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 1 
 
exists today despite the litany of violations the state is 
committing. 
2. The district court had jurisdiction under RCRA 
§ 7002(a)(2) to hear CARE’s citizen suit against 
the EPA. 
 RCRA § 7002(a) states that “[t]he district court shall have 
jurisdiction . . . to order the Administrator to perform the act or 
duty . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2006).  The EPA or New Union 
may assert that for citizen suits brought under § 7002(a)(2) the 
actions “may be brought in the district court in which the alleged 
violation occurred or in the District Court of the District of 
Columbia.”  Id.  The permissive may language is used as opposed 
to shall so that the party bringing the action can have a choice of 
forums.  However, both choices are district courts, and therefore 
the actions are to be brought before federal courts. 
II. JURISDICTION WAS PROPER UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 IN THE DISTRICT COURT TO ORDER THE 
EPA TO ACT ON CARE’S PROPERLY FILED 
PETITION UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 553(E) TO 
WITHDRAW EPA’S AUTHORIZATION OF NEW 
UNION’S HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM. 
 Pursuant to § 553(e) of the APA, every agency, including 
the EPA, must give an interested party the right to bring a 
petition for the repeal of a rule.  5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (emphasis 
added).  CARE properly submitted their petition under 5 U.S.C. § 
553(e) since the EPA‟s inaction toward New Union‟s state 
hazardous waste program was a rule, as discussed above, under 5 
U.S.C. § 551(4).  Because the jurisdictional question arises under 
the APA, a federal law, jurisdiction is proper in the district court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
13
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A. Since the EPA’s approval of New Union’s program 
was a rule under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), CARE must be 
given the right to petition for the repeal of that rule 
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). 
 Section 553(e) of the APA states that “[e]ach agency shall 
give an interested person the right to petition for the . . . repeal of 
a rule.  5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (emphasis added).  As noted above, 
EPA‟s inaction on CARE‟s petition was a rule under the APA, and 
therefore CARE‟s petition to repeal that rule is proper under § 
553(e).  As with RCRA, the APA uses both shall and may within 
its text.  While may is not used in another subsection within § 
553, may is used several times in addition to shall in § 552 
concerning public information.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).  The same 
analysis of shall used above pertains to the word‟s use in § 553(e).  
National Ass’n of Home Builders states that shall requires a 
mandatory nondiscretionary obligation.  551 U.S. at 661.  CARE 
has clearly met all the requirements under § 553(e), and therefore 
its petition was properly filed under § 553(e). 
B. Because 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) is a federal law, the district 
court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear 
CARE’s properly filed petition for the repeal of an 
agency rule. 
 The APA does not grant jurisdiction itself, but when 
combined with 28 U.S.C. § 1331, jurisdiction is sufficient “. . . over 
a challenge to federal agency action.”  Huang v. Mukasey, No. 
C07-132RAJ, 2008 WL 418048, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2008).  
Since the EPA, a federal agency, has violated a mandatory 
provision of the APA, federal courts have jurisdiction.  Reiner v. 
W. Village Assocs., 768 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1985), see Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).  As Saini v. U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services held, “. . . the APA vests the Court with 
jurisdiction to „compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed.‟”  553 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (E.D. Cal. 
2008) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)).  The district court erred in 
granting New Union‟s motion for summary judgment.  CARE is 
clearly allowed to petition the EPA for repeal of an agency rule 
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).  CARE‟s petition rightly found 
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jurisdiction before the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 since 
5 U.S.C. § 553(e), a federal law, demands that the EPA give 
CARE the right to petition. 
III. THE EPA'S FAILURE TO ACT WITHIN A 
REASONABLE TIME ON CARE'S PETITION WAS 
EQUIVALENT TO A DENIAL OF THE PETITION 
AND ULTIMATELY A GRANT OF 
AUTHORIZATION OF NEW UNION'S EXISTING 
PROGRAM, THE LATTER OF WHICH IS 
REVIEWABLE UNDER RCRA § 7006(B). 
 CARE's petition to withdraw authorization of New Union's 
existing program under RCRA § 7004 created a duty for EPA to 
take action on the petition “within a reasonable time following 
receipt of such petition.”  42. U.S.C. § 6974(a).  The APA defines 
“agency action” as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, 
license, sanction, relief or the equivalent or denial thereof, or 
failure to act.”  5. U.S.C. § 551(13) (2006) (emphasis added).  The 
EPA's inaction in this instance squarely fits the APA's definition 
of “agency action” and should be treated as such. 
A. The EPA’s failure to act on CARE’s petition should 
be classified as a denial of the petition. 
 In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, the D.C. 
Circuit examined circumstances under which there may be a 
judicial remedy for the failure of an administrative agency to act 
promptly.  428 F.2d 1093, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  The court 
reviewed the failure of the Secretary of the Department of 
Agriculture to take action with respect to a petition seeking 
cancellation of registration for the pesticide DDT.  Id. at 1096.  
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act required 
that pesticides shipped in interstate commerce bear labels that 
included warnings necessary to prevent injury to people.  Id. at 
1095.  The Secretary was to refuse or cancel the registration of 
pesticides failing to comply with this requirement.  Id.  The 
Environmental Defense Fund filed a petition with the Secretary 
requesting that notices of cancellation be issued for all poisons 
containing DDT and the suspension of registration for all such 
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products pending outcome of the proceedings.  Id. at 1096.  The 
Secretary issued notices of cancellation for four uses of DDT but 
took no action on the request for interim suspension.  Id.  The 
Secretary contended that partial compliance on the petition 
rendered the petitioners claim unripe because the Secretary had 
neither granted nor denied the requested relief.  Id. at 1098.  The 
court held that, “when administrative inaction has precisely the 
same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an 
agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in 
the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying 
relief.”  Id.  The Secretary's inaction with regard to the request 
for interim suspension of the registration of DDT was tantamount 
to an order denying suspension.  Id. 
 It is uncontested that the EPA took no action on CARE's 
petition to commence withdrawal proceedings.  However, the 
Administrator must respond in writing to petitions.  40 CFR § 
271.23(b)(1) (2010).  The Administrator has taken no action since 
CARE submitted its petition, issuing a de facto denial of CARE's 
petition.  The EPA did not commence withdrawal proceedings, 
and New Union's existing program continues to operate in lieu of 
federal regulations. 
B. The EPA's denial of CARE's petition was 
tantamount to a grant of authorization of New 
Union's existing program, making it subject to 
judicial review. 
 In U.S. Brewers Association, Inc. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit 
found that the EPA Administrator's refusal to repeal his 
regulation was, for jurisdictional purposes, not only equivalent to 
its promulgation but also reviewable because of this equivalency.  
600 F.2d 974, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).  The 
Brewers Association petitioned the EPA pursuant to § 7004 of 
RCRA, requesting repeal of guidelines issued for beverage 
containers.  Id.  The denial of the petition to repeal the 
regulations was held to be equivalent to a promulgation of the 
regulations, rendering that action subject to judicial review.  Id. 
 The Court of International Trade echoed this sentiment in 
Associacao Dos Industriais de Cordoaria e Redes v. U.S., where a 
group of importers brought an action against the Department of 
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Commerce and the International Trade Commission, among 
others, seeking mandamus against the agencies ordering them to 
terminate antidumping investigations and enjoining them from 
filing antidumping petitions for one year.  828 F. Supp. 978, 981 
(Ct. Int‟l Trade 1993).  The Department of Commerce argued that 
the importers did not have standing because the agency had not 
issued a final decision and therefore had not acted.  Id.  The court 
held that, specifically when administrative inaction has the same 
impact on the parties as a denial of relief, agency inaction may be 
tantamount to a final action.  Id.  The court further stated, “[the 
Department of] Commerce's position precludes review in 
circumstances where review would be most needed, in the face of 
administrative recalcitrance.”  Id. 
 Similarly, the EPA should not be allowed to evade judicial 
review by simply ignoring petitions.  The EPA was not deciding 
whether or not to take action.  The agency has taken no action at 
all.  As a result, citizens of New Union are subjected to the EPA's 
tacit approval of New Union's existing program, which is 
inconsistent with and not equivalent to federal regulations under 
RCRA.  This is a situation where judicial review is most needed, 
as the EPA‟s apparent intention is to continue approving this 
steadily declining state program.  In failing to take action on 
CARE's petition, and effectively denying it, the EPA has 
constructively granted authorization of New Union's existing 
state program. 
C. The presumption of unreviewability of agency 
inaction does not apply. 
 There is tension between the classification of agency 
inaction as action for purposes of review and the presumption of 
unreviewability of agency inaction articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).  In Chaney, 
prison inmates sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for enforcement of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, arguing that the drugs to 
be used in their execution were not approved for such use, and 
therefore violated the Act.  Id. at 823-24.  In response to the 
FDA‟s denial of their petition, the inmates brought a claim under 
§ 701(a)(2) of the APA in federal court seeking enforcement 
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actions on the claim.  Id.  The Court found that it lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to review the claim because an agency's 
decision not to take enforcement action is presumed immune from 
judicial review.  Id. at 832.  The Court stated that unreviewable 
agency inaction isn't suited for review where the statute in 
question was deemed absolutely committed to the agency's 
judgment.  Id. at 831.  Justice Rehnquist reasoned that an abuse 
of discretion analysis would prove futile without judicially 
manageable standards against which a court could judge an 
agency‟s exercise of discretion.  Id at 832.  Where Congress 
provides guidelines for an agency to follow, particularly in its 
exercise of enforcement powers within the substantive statute, 
agencies are not free to disregard legislative direction in the 
statutory scheme that they administer.  Id. at 832-33.  Available 
guidelines, or “law to apply,” is evidence of Congressional intent 
to circumscribe traditional agency enforcement discretion and 
should be treated as such.  Id. at 834-35. 
 Justice Marshall, concurring in Chaney, stated that the 
“'presumption of unreviewability' [was] fundamentally at odds 
with rule-of-law principles firmly embedded in our 
jurisprudence,” and hoped that this presumption would be limited 
to the facts of that case.  Id. at 840.  Justice Marshall stated, 
“discretion can be a veil for laziness, corruption, incompetence, 
lack of will, or other motives, and for that reason the presence of 
discretion should not bar a court from considering a claim of . . . 
arbitrary use of discretion.”  Id. at 847 (internal citations 
omitted).  A large, firmly entrenched body of lower-court 
jurisprudence refutes the majority's reliance on the “tradition” of 
unreviewability suggested in Chaney.  Id. at 850.  Additionally, 
these cases recognize that: 
attempting to draw a line for the purposes of judicial review 
between affirmative exercises of coercive agency power and 
negative agency refusals to act is simply untenable; one of the 
very purposes fueling the birth of administrative agencies was 
the reality that governmental refusal to act could have just as 
devastating an effect upon life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness as coercive governmental action.  As Justice 
Frankfurter . . . wrote for this Court, “any distinction, as such, 
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between 'negative' and 'affirmative' orders, as a touchstone of 
jurisdiction to review [agency action] serves no useful purpose.” 
Id. at 850-51 (quoting Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 
307 U.S. 125, 143 (1939)). 
 The EPA's regulations provide guidelines that the agency 
must follow in determining whether there is sufficient cause to 
initiate withdrawal proceedings under RCRA.  These guidelines 
are set forth in 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.4 (consistency), 271.9-14 
(equivalency of state program), and 271.22 (criteria for 
withdrawal of State programs) (2010).  The focus need not be 
centered on the inaction by the EPA, but rather on the effects of 
that inaction as well as the congressional intent for the agency to 
exercise its enforcement power under RCRA.  The EPA's inaction 
was agency action having the effect of granting authorization to 
New Union's existing program, review of which is proper under 
42 U.S.C. § 6976(b)(2). 
IV. BECAUSE JURISDICTION IS PROPER UNDER 42 
U.S.C. § 6976(B)(2), THE COURT OF APPEALS 
SHOULD LIFT THE STAY AND PROCEED WITH 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EPA'S CONSTRUCTIVE 
GRANT OF AUTHORIZATION. 
 The United States Courts of Appeals are inferior courts, 
created by Congress's Article III powers, and only have the 
jurisdiction that Congress confers upon them by statute.  15 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 
3901 (1976).  The statutory basis for this Court's direct review of 
the EPA's action in this case can be found in 42 U.S.C. § 
6976(b)(2). 
 RCRA § 7006(b) provides for “review of the Administrator's 
action . . . in granting, denying, or withdrawing authorization . . . 
under section 6926 of this title . . . in the Circuit Court of Appeals 
of the United States for the Federal judicial district in which such 
person resides . . . upon application by such person.”  42 U.S.C. § 
6976(b)(2).  Congress explicitly vested the Court of Appeals with 
subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims.  Although review in 
the District Court is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 6976 for the EPA's 
failure to take action on CARE's petition, that failure had the 
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effect of a grant of authorization of New Union's program, and is 
reviewable in this Court.  Public policy favors lifting the stay in 
the action currently before this Court and proceeding with 
judicial review of the EPA's constructive grant of authorization. 
A. Congressional intent favors review of the 
Administrator's grant of authorization of a State 
program in the Court of Appeals. 
 The plain language of § 6976(b)(2) explicitly provides for 
appellate review of the Administrator's grant of authorization 
under 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) in the Court of Appeals.  42 U.S.C. § 
6976(b) (2006).  Section 6976(b) concludes, “such review shall be 
in accordance with sections 701 through 706 of Title 5 of the 
APA.”  Id. 
 Looking to the APA for additional support and clarification, 
§ 701(b)(2) references          § 551(13) of the Act for the definition 
of specific terms.  5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) (2006).  As previously 
addressed, “agency action” is defined in this section as inclusive 
of failure to act.       5 U.S.C. § 551(13).  Therefore under the APA, 
it is fair to read the Court of Appeals‟s grant of jurisdiction under 
section 6976(b)(2) as, “review of the Administrator's failure to act 
in granting, denying, or withdrawing authorization . . . under 
section 6926 of this title.” 
 The APA's support of CARE's position does not end with § 
701.  Section 703 sets out the form and venue for judicial review.  
5 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).  In pertinent part, § 703 states, “the form of 
proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review 
proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by 
statute.”  Id.  Additionally, § 704, describing the types of 
reviewable actions, states that “[a]gency action made reviewable 
by statute and final agency action for which there is no other 
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”       5 
U.S.C. § 704 (2006) (emphasis added).  These relevant sections of 
the APA again direct the court to the grant of subject-matter 
jurisdiction contained in § 6976(b)(2).  Full effect must be given to 
the clear congressional intent to grant jurisdiction over these 
types of actions to the Courts of Appeals.  To hold otherwise 
would render this section of RCRA meaningless. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/5
05 Appellant 4/24/2011  2:30 AM 
146  PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 1 
 
B. Judicial economy also favors review of the 
Administrator's grant  of authorization of a state 
program in the Court of Appeals. 
 A careful consideration of the effect of the other alternative 
before the Court, remanding to the District Court, provides 
further support for lifting the stay and proceeding in this Court.  
The injunctive relief offered by the district court ordering the 
EPA to act on CARE's petition, i.e., exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, is an inadequate means of relief.  Requiring the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Woodford v. Ngo   unnecessarily complicates 
this judicial review.  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). 
 Assuming this action is remanded to the district court, and 
the EPA is required to take action on CARE's petition, the result 
would require the EPA to formalize a determination it already 
made — denial of the petition.  This creates a redundancy in the 
judicial review, weighing heavily against established public policy 
favoring judicial economy.  By not acting, the EPA made its 
determination and granted authorization of New Union's 
program as it existed.  Requiring the EPA to make this 
determination formal explicitly adds an unnecessary step in the 
judicial review of the EPA's grant of authorization.  After the 
district court required the EPA to formalize its decision, this 
Court would be the eventual audience of CARE's cause of action 
for review.  CARE would be asking this Court to review the EPA's 
arbitrary and capricious grant of authorization of New Union's 
program at the time of CARE's petition.  Meanwhile, the 
continuing approval of New Union's program would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit from 
requiring that there be strict compliance with this procedure.  
Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981) § 5-103 
(providing an exception to the requirement that there be 
exhaustion of administrative remedy prior to review). 
 It makes little sense to remand to the district court, 
considering Congress intended to give this Court the authority to 
review actions by the Administrator in granting, denying, or 
withdrawing state authorization.  If, in enacting RCRA, Congress 
intended that as a matter of national policy, hazardous wastes 
were to be comprehensively regulated, it strains credulity to 
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assert that Congress meant for the EPA to stand passively aside 
while New Union flagrantly violates its statutory mandates.  
Absent compliance with the regulatory framework, hazardous 
waste will continue to be disposed of in manners that result in 
significant, and sometimes irreversible, damage to the 
environment.  Both the congressional intent of RCRA and judicial 
economy heavily favor that the Court lift the stay and review the 
EPA's grant of authorization of New Union's program. 
V. NEW UNION’S RESOURCES AND 
PERFORMANCE DO NOT MEET STATE-
AUTHORIZATION STANDARDS; THEREFORE, 
EPA MUST WITHDRAW APPROVAL BECAUSE 
CONGRESS EXPLICITLY LIMITED THE 
AGENCY’S DISCRETION AND CHANEY’S 
PRESUMPTION DOES NOT APPLY. 
Although the critical issue before the Court is the EPA‟s 
mandatory duty to withdraw authorization, there must be a 
threshold showing of New Union‟s inability to meet RCRA 
authorization criteria.  To maintain state authorization, RCRA 
requires three conditions be met.  First, the state program must 
be equivalent to the federal program.  42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).  In 
other words, a state program must at least meet the minimum 
standards the federal program establishes.  4 William H. 
Rodgers, Jr., Rodger’s Envtl.  L. § 7:22 (2010).  Second, a state‟s 
program must be consistent with the federal or state programs in 
other states.  42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).  Third, the state‟s program 
must provide adequate enforcement to comply with these 
requirements.  Id.  Parts VI and VII look at New Union‟s failure 
to comply with the consistency requirement.  This Part addresses 
the program‟s failure to satisfy the equivalency and enforcement 
standards established in RCRA § 3006(b), and why this failure 
mandates withdrawal. 
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A. New Union’s hazardous waste program has fallen 
well below the equivalency and enforcement 
standards necessary for state authorization. 
The EPA established the basic minimum requirements for the 
federal program throughout Part 271 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations entitled “Requirements for Authorization of State 
Hazardous Waste Programs.”  According to the documents 
provided by New Union to the EPA, the state has failed to 
implement even the basic requirements necessary to meet these 
minimum standards.  The DEP‟s 2009 Annual Report shows that 
currently at least 60% of New Union‟s 1500 TSDs operate with an 
expired permit.  (Order at 11).  New Union further concedes that 
under the state‟s policy of granting approximately 50 of its 125 
annual permits to new or permitted facilities seeking expansion, 
only 75 permits are left to address the 900 facilities operating 
without a current permit.  Id.  Thinking optimistically, and 
assuming the 900 figure remains static, it would take New Union 
at least 12 years to bring its permitting program into federal 
RCRA compliance.  Of course, the Governor‟s likely termination 
of up to 10% of the DEP‟s current employees administering the 
program tempers this optimism.  (Order at 10-11).  In light of 
this, it seems almost unnecessary to point out that § 271.13 
requires New Union to prohibit operation of TSDs without a 
permit.  40 C.F.R. § 271.13 (2010).  New Union‟s permitting 
program did not meet the minimum standards at the time of 
CARE‟s petition, and it is unlikely that it will do so in the near 
future. 
 Unfortunately, New Union‟s inspection and investigation 
resources fall even shorter of the federal minimum standard than 
the state‟s permitting program.  The EPA‟s regulations 
unequivocally require a state to have adequate inspection and 
investigation resources to monitor the state program.  40 C.F.R. § 
271.15(a), (b) (2010).  In this light, the EPA approved New 
Union‟s hazardous waste program nearly 25 years ago with the 
assurance that New Union had the resources to “inspect[] RCRA 
regulated facilities at least every other year.”  (Order at 11) 
(emphasis added).  Instead of inspecting all facilities every other 
year, New Union currently has only enough resources to inspect 
20% of the facilities in this timeframe.  Id.  Even after soliciting 
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the EPA‟s assistance, the state can inspect 40% at most.  Id.  
Worse yet, the decrease in DEP inspectors from 15 to seven since 
1986 is likely to worsen because of personnel cuts to programs in 
which federal employees can perform state employees‟ functions.  
(Order at 10). 
 Finally, DEP‟s proven inability to prosecute even one-third 
of the significant permit violations — much less the hundreds of 
“minor” violations — demonstrates New Union‟s complete 
inability to implement the enforcement standards necessary to 
ensure compliance.  (Order at 11).  Once again, the EPA‟s 
regulations leave no doubt as to the state‟s expected enforcement 
authority.  A state must have remedies available to “restrain 
immediately and effectively” all facilities not in compliance with 
their permits or endangering the public and environment.  40 
C.F.R. § 271.16 (2010).  Clearly, the 12 enforcement actions taken 
last year by the state and the EPA fall noticeably short of 
restraining the 900 facilities that are subject to this regulation.  
(Order at 11). 
B. The plain language of Section 3006(e) requires that 
the EPA withdraw authorization of New Union’s 
hazardous waste program. 
 While New Union‟s deficiencies are clear, this Court must 
address the more difficult question of whether RCRA requires the 
EPA‟s withdrawal of state authorization.  Though the EPA 
contends RCRA gives the agency considerable discretion 
concerning withdrawal decisions, this Court must first look to see 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.  After examining the statute 
and case law, it is clear that Congress indeed addressed this 
issue, and that the EPA misconstrued its discretion to determine 
whether state authorization is satisfied with its duty to withdraw 
authorization once a determination is made that the state does 
not meet this criteria.  Because Congress gave the EPA no 
discretion concerning withdrawal decisions after a deficiency 
determination is made, the EPA must begin withdrawal 
proceedings against New Union under § 3006(e) of RCRA. 
 “The starting point for [the] interpretation of a statute is 
always its language.”  Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 
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490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989).  Concerning withdrawal, RCRA states 
that after the EPA determines a state program is not meeting 
authorization standards, the Administrator shall notify the state 
and give them opportunity to correct the deficiencies.          42 
U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2010) (emphasis added).  If no corrective action 
is taken, “the Administrator shall withdraw authorization of such 
program and establish a Federal         program . . . .”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  The statute uses conditional language to mark 
where the EPA‟s discretion ends and statutory duties begin.  
Subsection (e)‟s first clause implicitly recognizes the EPA‟s 
discretion to determine whether a state has properly 
administered and enforced an authorized program.  Id.  The 
language, “[w]henever the Administrator     determines . . . ,” 
shows Congress intended to let the EPA, with its environmental 
expertise, assess the sufficiency of the technical standards 
necessary to maintain state authorization.  Id. 
However, the EPA‟s discretion ends with this first clause.  
The remaining language in subsection (e) switches gears, 
directing the Administrator to take specific action.  As noted 
above, use of the word shall leaves little room for debate.  See 
supra, Part I.C.  Indeed, “[t]he word „shall‟ is ordinarily [t]he 
language of command.”  Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 
(1947).  Because RCRA “uses both „may‟ and „shall‟, the normal 
inference is that each is used in its usual sense - the one act being 
permissive, the other mandatory.”  Id.  The agency does have 
discretion, but that discretion is limited to determining whether a 
state continues to meet authorization requirements.  Once the 
EPA makes that determination, the discretion ends, and 
Congress mandates that authorization be withdrawn. 
 Fortunately, this argument does not rest on parsing 
statutory language alone, but also on sound jurisprudence.  In 
National Wildlife Federation v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit held that 
the Safe Drinking Water Act gave the EPA no discretion to refuse 
withdrawing state authorization under that act.1  980 F.2d 765, 
 
 1.  The circuit court‟s description of the SDWA in National Wildlife 
Federation demonstrates the applicability of D.C. Court‟s analysis to the RCRA 
analysis before this Court.  Under the SDWA, the EPA established safe water 
drinking standards, granted states primacy to implement their own programs, 
and then monitored compliance.  980 F.2d at 768.  If a state no longer met the 
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767-68 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  Although the EPA amended its 
withdrawal regulation to state, “the Administrator may initiate 
proceedings to withdraw program approval,” and its preamble “to 
make clear that the Agency‟s decision to initiate withdrawal . . . is 
discretionary,” these revisions did not overrule the statutory 
requirement that non-compliance triggered withdrawal.  Id. at 
769, 772.  Giving the EPA discretion to determine whether a state 
program met approval and whether to withdraw approval if it did 
not, would strip the statute of its plain meaning and “would 
require nothing from the agency.”  Id. at 772.  This power grab is 
precisely what the EPA is trying to do once again by refusing to 
initiate withdrawal proceedings against New Union.  Under the 
EPA‟s interpretation of the statute, the agency wields unlimited 
power in the state-authorization field with no Congressional 
oversight.  Congress did not intend nor codify such a delegation of 
power. 
C. Chaney’s presumption is inapplicable because the 
Court must interpret a statutory provision and 
Congress provided ‘law to apply.’ 
 This argument does not run counter to the policy 
considerations and principles announced in Heckler v. Chaney, 
limiting judicial review of agency non-enforcement decisions.  470 
U.S. 821 (1985).  First, while the policy considerations established 
in Chaney may weigh against judicially mandating New Union‟s 
withdrawal, the issue at hand primarily focuses on EPA‟s 
statutory duties and the interpretation of RCRA‟s withdrawal 
provision.  As National Wildlife Federation pointed out, even in 
the context of a non-enforcement decision, “when a legal 
challenge focuses on an announcement of a substantive statutory 
interpretation, courts are emphatically qualified to decide 
whether an agency has acted outside the bounds of reason . . . .”  
980 F.2d at 773 (quoting Int’l Union United Auto., Aerospace, & 
Agric. Implement Workers v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 245-46 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986)).  Here, the agency has done just that. 
 
primacy criteria, the Administrator was to notify the state of its decision and, if 
not corrected, § 1413(b) of the SDWA required the Administrator to withdraw 
primacy.  Id.  The similarities in the analyses are obvious. 
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Most critically, Chaney‟s presumption does not apply because 
RCRA provides „law to apply‟ that limits the EPA‟s discretion.  “If 
[Congress] has indicated an intent to circumscribe agency 
enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful standards 
for defining the limits of that discretion, there is „law to apply‟ . . . 
and courts may require the agency to follow that      law . . . .”  
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 834-35.  Section 3006(e)‟s use of mandatory 
language unmistakably shows where the EPA‟s discretion ends 
and its duty begins.  Once it determines a state program no 
longer meets authorization requirements, the EPA must 
withdraw authorization.  Congress‟s intent could not be any 
clearer.  Therefore, Chaney‟s presumption does not apply. 
VI. THE EPA MUST WITHDRAW AUTHORIZATION 
OF NEW UNION’S PROGRAM BECAUSE THE 
ERAA AMENDMENT TO THE RRA IS 
INCONSISTENT UNDER THE HAZARDOUS 
MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION ACT AND RCRA. 
In 1975, Congress passed the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act (“HMTA”) to regulate the transport of 
hazardous waste in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.           
49 U.S.C. § 5101 (2006).  The EPA adopted the Department of 
Transportation‟s hazardous material regulations implementing 
the HMTA in order to satisfy their obligation under § 3003 of 
RCRA to govern the transport of hazardous waste.  42 U.S.C. § 
6923 (2006).  The ERAA‟s amendment to the RRA renders the law 
inconsistent with the HMTA, and the federal statute therefore 
preempts the state law.  As such, New Union‟s program is 
inconsistent with the federal RCRA program, and the EPA should 
withdraw its authorization. 
A. The ERAA is preempted by the HMTA because the 
statute is inconsistent under the second prong of 
the HMTA’s preemption analysis. 
In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Public Service 
Commission of Nevada, the Ninth Circuit considered a 
preemption challenge to regulations of the Nevada Public Service 
Commission vesting the Commission with, among other things, 
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permitting authority over the loading, unloading, transfer, and 
storage of hazardous material on railroad property.  909 F.2d 352, 
354 (9th Cir. 1990).  The court began its analysis by explaining 
that the HMTA‟s goal was to create a national, uniform scheme of 
hazardous material transportation to “replace a patchwork of 
state and federal laws and regulations . . . .”  Id. at 353.  To meet 
this goal, the HMTA expressly preempted state or local 
regulations inconsistent with the statute.  Id. at 355.  The statute 
defined “inconsistent” as situations where (1) compliance with the 
local regulations and the HMTA were impossible or (2) the local 
regulations were an obstacle to the accomplishment or execution 
of the HMTA.  Id.  According to the Ninth Circuit, the Nevada 
regulations fit this definition because they “create[d] a separate 
regulatory regime for these activities, fostering confusion and 
frustrating Congress‟ goal of developing a uniform, national 
scheme of regulation.”  Id. at 358.  The court also expressed 
concern over the Commission‟s presumed ability to arbitrarily 
approve or deny permits irrespective of federal regulations and 
the potential expense and delay that would accompany such 
discretion.  Id.  Therefore, the court found that the Nevada 
regulations violated the second leg of the HMTA‟s inconsistency 
analysis and were preempted by the federal statute.  Id. at 359. 
The amendment to the RRA raises the same concerns as the 
preempted regulations in Southern Pacific and likewise fails the 
second prong of the HMTA‟s inconsistency definition.  By 
transferring permitting and inspection authority of railroad 
hazardous waste facilities from the state program to the 
Commission, New Union creates a duplicative burden on railroad 
hazardous material transporters, subjecting them to two 
regulatory regimes.  As the D.C. Circuit pointed out, Congress 
passed the HMTA in order to consolidate precisely this type of 
regulation.  CSX Transp., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 901 
F.2d 497, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  The redundant burden of 
following both the HMTA‟s and the Commission‟s regulations will 
result in frustration, delay, and unnecessary expense for railroad 
transporters of hazardous waste.  New Union‟s amendment to the 
RRA transferring this authority to the Commission is 
inconsistent with the HMTA and is therefore preempted by § 
5125(a) of the HMTA.  49 U.S.C. § 5125(a) (2006). 
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B. The ERAA is inconsistent under RCRA because the 
amendment fails to meet the EPA’s regulations. 
Further, New Union‟s treatment of railroad hazardous waste 
facilities renders the state‟s program inconsistent with the EPA‟s 
own regulatory definitions that set RCRA‟s minimum standards.  
Governing transporters of hazardous waste, § 271.11 mandates 
that a state program must cover all transporters listed in § 263, 
including rail.  40 C.F.R. § 271.11 (2010).  The ERAA removed 
rail transporters from the oversight of the DEP (and thus New 
Union‟s hazardous waste program) and transferred that authority 
to the Commission.  Therefore, New Union‟s program no longer 
sets standards for that class of transporters, directly 
contravening § 271.11.  Next, the ERAA fails § 271.13 because 
state law and the DEP no longer govern permitting under the 
RRA, again vesting that authority in the Commission.  State law, 
not a state agency, “must require permits for owners and 
operators of all hazardous waste management facilities . . . .”  40 
C.F.R. § 271.13 (emphasis added).  Shifting permitting authority 
to the Commission eliminates the political accountability 
inherent in a state law-permitting regime - a crucial 
consideration in environmental policy.  Finally and most 
blatantly, New Union‟s RCRA program lacks the requisite 
enforcement authority under § 271.16.  That section 
unequivocally states that any approved program must have 
criminal remedies available for violations of permit requirements.  
40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(3) (2010).  Yet the ERAA explicitly 
eliminated all criminal liability for facilities under the 
Commission violating environmental statutes (presumably state 
or federal).  Once again, the ERAA puts New Union‟s hazardous 
waste program on unequal ground with the federal RCRA 
program. 
According to Congress, a state program may differ from the 
federal model in that states may adopt more stringent 
requirements than those promulgated by the EPA.  However, 
New Union‟s treatment of railroad hazardous waste facilities does 
precisely the opposite, completely removing them from the state‟s 
RCRA program.  New Union‟s state program is plainly 
inconsistent with the federal RCRA program and must be 
withdrawn. 
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VII. NEW UNION’S TREATMENT OF POLLUTANT X IS 
PREEMPTED BY THE HMTA, FAILS RCRA’S 
CONSISTENCY DEFINITION, AND VIOLATES 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE; THEREFORE, THE 
EPA MUST WITHDRAW ITS AUTHORIZATION OF 
NEW UNION’S PROGRAM. 
A. New Union’s amendment to the ERAA regarding 
Pollutant X is preempted by the HMTA. 
Like the amendment to the RRA, the HMTA preempts New 
Union‟s amendment to the HRA prohibiting transporters of 
Pollutant X from stopping within the state.  Complying with this 
provision of the HRA presents obstacles to accomplishing the 
purpose of the HMTA - safety through uniform regulation of 
hazardous material transportation.  For example, since one may 
only stop in New Union for emergencies or refueling, a 
transporter would have to construct routes around New Union in 
order to accommodate for meals, lodging, or periodic breaks.  This 
rerouting could lead to longer routes and more time spent in 
transit. 
As the Federal Railroad Administration pointed out, “the risk 
of releases of hazardous materials is reduced by minimizing the 
time such shipments spend in transportation.  It would be poor 
policy to allow local governments to attempt to lower their risk by 
raising everyone’s risk and by clogging the transportation 
system.”  Track Safety Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,999 
(June 22, 1998) (emphasis added).  In the context of the rail 
system, § 172.822 specifically prohibits a state law that limits use 
of a rail line for transporting hazardous materials.  49 C.F.R. § 
172.822 (2010).  In fact, the regulation warns that any such law is 
preempted.  Id.  It is clear that both the RRA and HRA 
amendments significantly infringe on the HMTA‟s ability to 
establish uniform regulations for hazardous waste transportation 
and are statutorily inconsistent under 49 U.S.C. § 5125(a).  The 
HMTA preempts the amendments and renders New Union‟s 
program inconsistent with the federal RCRA program. 
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B. New Union’s treatment of Pollutant X is 
inconsistent with RCRA. 
New Union‟s amendment concerning Pollutant X is 
inconsistent with § 271.4‟s regulatory definition of consistency, 
particularly subpart (a).  Initially, it is worth noting that the 
EPA‟s consistency requirement could be interpreted as simply 
another characterization of RCRA‟s command that a state 
program be at least as stringent as, or equivalent to, the federal 
program.  Rodgers, supra, at § 7:22.  As discussed above, New 
Union‟s program falls well below these standards.  More 
specifically, the provision of the HRA amendment prohibiting 
TSD permits for Pollutant X directly violates § 271.4(a)‟s rule 
that no aspect of a state program may unreasonably restrict or 
impede the free movement of hazardous waste across the state 
border from or to other states.  40 C.F.R. § 271.4(a) (2010).  This 
is precisely what New Union has done.  On its face, the statute 
demonstrates New Union‟s goal to put all Pollutant X 
responsibilities on “facilit[ies] located outside of the state,” 
regardless of a party‟s potential willingness to construct a facility 
in the state capable of Pollutant X treatment, disposal, or storage.  
(Order at 12).  As the Supreme Court and other circuits have 
made clear, a state may not hoard its natural resources and place 
the burden of conserving the state‟s natural resources on out-of-
state parties.  City of Phila. v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978), 
Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 786 (4th Cir. 
1996). 
Additionally, the HRA amendment provision restricting 
transportation of Pollutant X through New Union likewise 
violates subsection (a)‟s rule.  Although New Union tries to 
conceal its intent behind permissive language (“[a]ny person may. 
. .”), the prohibitive effect of the provision is clear.  (Order at 12).  
As explained above in the preemption context, this provision will 
require some transporters to avoid New Union because drivers 
invariably must stop for meals, lodging, and breaks.  However, 
under New Union‟s amendment, these reasons are impermissible.  
The New Union law operates as a restriction, impediment, and 
ban on the free movement of hazardous waste across its border, 
thus violating § 271.4(a). 
31
05 Appellant 4/24/2011  2:30 AM 
2011] BEST BRIEF: APPELLANTS 157 
 
C. New Union’s treatment of Pollutant X violates the 
Commerce Clause. 
The ERAA amendment prohibiting the importation or 
treatment of Pollutant X is unquestionably subject to Commerce 
Clause scrutiny.  “It is well settled that actions are within the 
domain of the Commerce Clause if they burden interstate 
commerce or impede its free flow.”  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (emphasis added), see C & A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) 
(“[T]he article of commerce is not so much the solid waste itself, 
but rather the service of processing and disposing of it.”).  A more 
difficult question asks which well-established Commerce Clause 
analysis applies to the ERAA.  Because the statute, in substance, 
discriminates against interstate commerce, it is subject to strict 
scrutiny.  The statute fails this level of constitutional scrutiny. 
The cleverly crafted ERAA amendment presents the precise 
opposite - though no less unconstitutional - discrimination 
invalidated in C & A Carbone and similar cases.  In Carbone, the 
Supreme Court established that the Commerce Clause “presumes 
a national market free from local legislation that discriminates in 
favor of local interests.”  Id. at 393.  Against this backdrop, the 
Court measured the town of Clarkstown‟s ordinance commanding 
local waste be deposited at a specific local facility.  Id. at 386.  
Facing the same dilemma before this Court, Justice Kennedy 
explained that “[t]he real question” was whether the ordinance 
per se violated the Commerce Clause under City of Philadelphia, 
or whether the more lenient balancing test was appropriate 
under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  C & 
A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 389. 
Finding the ordinance per se unconstitutional, the Court 
looked past the ordinance‟s explicit terms and focused on the 
“practical effect and design” instead.  Id. at 394.  The practical 
effect was plain - the ordinance barred importing a service and 
deprived competitors of access to local markets.  Id. at 386, 392.  
Further, the ordinance was “no less discriminatory because in-
state or in-town processors are also covered by the prohibition.”  
Id. at 391.  The Court‟s message was clear - the Commerce Clause 
invalidates local laws completely prohibiting interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 390. 
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Just as the Supreme Court did in Carbone, this Court must 
examine the ERAA‟s “overall effect on local and interstate 
commerce.”  Waste Sys. Corp. v. Cnty. of Marion, 985 F.2d 1381, 
1386 (8th Cir. 1993).  Unlike the ordinance in Carbone, the ERAA 
states that all Pollutant X must be treated, stored, or disposed of 
somewhere - indeed, anywhere - other than New Union.  Besides 
breaching the common-sense prohibition that a state “may not 
attach restrictions to exports or imports in order to control 
commerce in other [s]tates,” C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393, the 
ERAA violates the Commerce Clause in a much more 
fundamental way.  Our Nation is one economic unit.  Cnty. of 
Marion, 985 F.2d at 1388.  As such, “one state may not „isolate 
itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier 
against the movement of interstate trade.‟”  Gov’t Suppliers 
Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1277 (7th Cir. 
1992) (quoting City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 628). 
This is precisely what New Union has done.  
Understandably, the state is concerned with the well-being of its 
citizens.  But the courts have squarely rejected health, safety, and 
environmental justifications as sufficient to uphold a complete 
restriction on interstate commerce.  Cnty. of Marion, 985 F.2d at 
1388-89.  The Pollutant X problem is not unique to New Union; it 
is shared by all.  Only with coordinated interstate cooperation 
will the solution to this threat be achieved.  Where the ordinances 
in C & A Carbone and County of Marion completely forbade the 
transport of waste out of those areas, New Union may no more 
permissibly block the transport of waste into the state.  As City of 
Philadelphia bluntly stated, “the clearest example of such 
[impermissible] legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of 
interstate commerce at a State‟s borders.  437 U.S. at 624.  
Because interstate commerce flows out of and into a state, the 
ERAA amendment is a per se violation of the Commerce Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
 CARE petitioned the EPA to withdraw approval of New 
Union‟s hazardous waste program that was blatantly in violation 
of the EPA‟s approved state program.  New Union‟s program 
should not continue to operate because the district court erred in 
denying CARE jurisdiction under RCRA § 7002(A)(2) and 28 
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U.S.C. § 1331.  The EPA‟s failure to act on CARE‟s petition was a 
grant of authorization for New Union‟s program, reviewable 
under RCRA § 7006(b)(2). 
 The deficiencies in New Union‟s program are so egregious 
that the EPA must withdraw its approval because Congress has 
limited the agency‟s discretion, the ERAA amendments are 
inconsistent and preempted by the HMTA, and New Union‟s 
treatment of Pollutant X violates the Commerce Clause.  For the 
foregoing reasons, CARE respectfully requests that this Court 
REVERSE the decision of the district court denying CARE‟s 
claims for lack of jurisdiction, lift the stay, and review the EPA‟s 
grant of authorization for New Union‟s program.  
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